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PREVENTING THE TAIL FROM
WAGGING THE DOG:
WHYAPPRENDI's BARK IS WORSE
THAN ITS BITE
INTRODUCTION
Place yourself in the position of a white man accused of firing a
gun into the home of a black family.1 You agree to plead guilty to
second-degree possession of a firearm, which carries a maximum
penalty under state law of ten years in prison. At your sentencing
hearing, the prosecutor asks the judge to sentence you to twenty years
because your purpose was racial intimidation. Such a purpose vio-
lates the state's hate crime statute. The judge determines-by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence-that your crime was motivated by race
and sentences you to twelve years in prison. You think this sentence
enhancement violates your due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and your right to have a jury determine guilt- beyond a
reasonable doubt-under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court
agrees with you, holding that the judge cannot increase the statutory
maximum penalty by dtermining your motivation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The "tail" cannot wag the "dog" of the substan-
tive offense.2
While most people understandably have difficulty sympathizing
with you, many experts hail your case as a watershed decision in the
history of constitutional law-a decision that will send shock waves
through the legal community and revolutionize sentencing.3 A closer
look, however, reveals the unremarkable nature of the Supreme
1 All of the facts in the Introduction are based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
(2000).
2 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88
(1986)) (holding that a possession finding is "a tail which wags the dog of a substantive of-
fense" when it is used to increase the maximum punishment for the offense).
3 See Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing, WASH. POST, July
23, 2000, at Al. The article quotes several scholars and legal professionals, whose opinions
reflect the general sentiment in the aftermath of Apprendi. Professor Susan Klein speculates
that thirty-nine federal and twenty state laws may be unconstitutional and asserts "[i]t's just
going to be a disaster." Id. Chief Judge Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit calls it "a case
of enormous potential importance" with which courts will "have to spend a lot of time dealing."
Id. at A15.
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Court's decision and the limited impact the decision will have.
Granted, the decision will dramatically affect certain statutes, but for
the most part judges will continue sentencing as usual. The current
sentencing rule is no different from the one you were sentenced un-
der: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."4
Congratulations, though, because your case forced the Supreme Court
to provide a succinct statement of the law.
By examining Apprendi's impact on criminal sentencing, this
Note has a two-fold purpose.5 First, it will show that a close reading
of the Supreme Court sentencing cases preceding Apprendi v. New
Jersey reveals the unsurprising nature of the decision. In fact, any
other decision would have contradicted previous statements of the
law. The Supreme Court has never allowed a judge to sentence above
the statutory maximum based on factors determined by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
6
Second, this Note will illustrate Apprendi's potential impact
through the use of two representative examples under federal law.
There are many statutes-state and federal-that Apprendi could af-
fect, including most hate crime statutes. This Note will focus on a
federal drug statute7 and a possible sentencing ramification under the
Sherman Antitrust Act.8 Generally, Apprendi will have a limited im-
pact, but its effect on specific statutes could be dramatic and will
greatly affect how the United States Government prosecutes possible
offenders.
This Note is divided into three sections. Part I discusses the vari-
ous opinions in the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision in Apprendi
v. New Jersey.9 Part II discusses the evolution of sentencing over the
past thirty years. The analysis is divided into two subsections to illus-
trate the Court's acceptance of so-called "sentencing factors," 10 which
4 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
s The purpose of this Note is not to discuss whether the Court was right or wrong, nor to
discuss Apprendi's impact on the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Rather, the Note exam-
ines the historical evolution of sentencing and Apprendi's future effects.
6 As discussed below, an exception exists for prior convictions. The rationale, however,
is that those convictions were determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 496 ("[Tlhere is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment
of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the
right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge
to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.").
7 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
9 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
10 As expanded upon below, this term first appeared in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986).
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the judge is allowed to consider by a preponderance of the evidence
as long as the sentence remains within the statutory range. The Court
first accepted sentencing factors in 1986, so Part II is divided into
discussions of pre- and post-1986 cases.11 Part IT discusses the likely
fallout after Apprendi. The decision will generally not have a major
impact, because it will not operate retroactively, 12 and will not affect
those sentences that are within the statutory range 13 or are enhanced
due to prior convictions.
14
Apprendi's effect on specific statutes, however, could be dra-
matic. This Note will focus on two federal statutes-one dealing with
a street crime 5 and one dealing with a white-collar crime. 16 Basi-
cally, judges should no longer be able to impose sentences exceeding
the statutory maximum by determining the amount of drugs involved
by a preponderance of the evidence, 17 and the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") should no longer be
able to use another statute 8 to obtain corporate fines in excess of
those specified in the Sherman Act.19 A sentencing factor cannot op-
erate as "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense., 20
I CONTEXT: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN APPRENDI V.
NEW JERSEY
In June 2000, the Supreme Court upheld Miranda warnings, 21 re-
jected a law prohibiting partial birth abortions,2 and ruled that the
Boy Scouts could ban homosexual leaders.2 3 The controversial nature
of these cases overshadowed another decision dealing with what most
Americans consider a fundamental right-the right to have a jury of
one's peers determine criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Be-
fore discussing the history behind Apprendi and its likely effects, we
must first understand the decision itself. Thus, an in-depth explora-
" See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
12 See infra Part In.A.1.
13 See infra Part III.A.2.
14 See infra Part ll.A.3.
'5 See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) (dealing with drug-related offenses).
16 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (dealing with restraints of trade).
17 See infra Part iM.B.1.
'8 See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994) (dealing with fines for criminal offenses).
'9 See infra Part 1l1.B.2.
20 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
21 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that Miranda may not be
overruled by an act of Congress and declining to overrule Miranda itself).
2 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (holding that a Nebraska statute criminalizing
partial birth abortions violates the Constitution).
23 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that a New Jersey public
accommodations law violates the Boy Scout's First Amendment right to expressive association).
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tion of the several opinions that constituted the Supreme Court's ma-
jority and minority positions is warranted.
A. The Facts24
Charles Apprendi fired several shots into the home of a black
family and gave police a statement-later retracted-that he did not
want a black family moving into his all-white neighborhood. He was
charged under New Jersey law with, among other things, second-
degree possession of a firearm,25 which carries a prison term of five to
ten years. Apprendi pled guilty to this count. The indictment did not
refer to New Jersey's hate crime statute,26 which allows an enhanced
sentence of up to twenty years if the trial judge finds by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant's purpose was racial intimida-
tion.27 After finding such a purpose, the trial judge imposed a twelve-
year sentence on Apprendi, two years greater than the statutory
maximum for possessing a firearm. Apprendi challenged the sen-
tence on the ground that the hate crime sentence enhancement vio-
lated the United States Constitution.
B. The Result in New Jersey State Courts
Despite contrary testimony, the trial judge found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence "that the crime was motivated by racial bias."
28
The state appellate court upheld the sentence, finding that the New
Jersey legislature decided to make the hate crime enhancement a
"sentencing factor" rather than an element of the underlying offense.29
A divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that "the
Legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by
sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight to be
given that factor., 3° The Supreme Court reversed by a margin of five
to four, with the majority consisting of Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
31
24 All of the facts are found in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469-474 (2000).
Many of the facts are duplicated from the Introduction to facilitate understanding and allow for
citations to the relevant New Jersey statutory provisions.
25 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995) (prohibiting possession of weapons for
unlawful purposes).
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000).
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West Supp. 2000).
28 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at471.
29 Id. The appellate court's decision is State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
30 State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485,494-95 (NJ. 1999).
31 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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C. The Majority Opinion (Justice Stevens)
Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting that the Court was
not considering the constitutionality of hate crime laws, but rather
was considering the constitutionality of the sentencing procedure in
New Jersey.32 The answer to whether Apprendi had a constitutional
right to have a jury determine racial bias beyond a reasonable doubt
was foreshadowed by Jones v. United States,33 where the Court noted
that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. '34 The Fourteenth Amendment
extends the Fifth Amendment protection to cases involving state stat-
utes.35 Stevens found that these rights "indisputably entitle a criminal
defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element
of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'
36
Stevens next examined the historical bases for the ruling.
Throughout history, courts have recognized the right to trial by jury
and the right to have a jury verdict based on proof beyond a reason-
able doubt on every element of the crime.37 Distinctions between
"sentencing factors" and "elements" of offenses were not recognized
throughout history.38 Trial judges exercised discretion while impos-
ing sentences within statutory limits, but their discretion was bound
by the sentencing range prescribed by the legislature.39 This brief
historical overview "highlight[s] the novelty of a legislative scheme
that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found,
exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum
he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the
jury verdict alone."'4
Stevens then considered precedent. Generally, a state cannot cir-
cumvent due process protections by redefining the elements of a
crime and characterizing them as bearing solely on the extent of pun-
ishment. 41 In 1986, however, the Court allowed a judge to use "sen-
32 Id at 474-75.
31 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Jones is also discussed infra Part II.B.
34 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
35 Id.
36 Id at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
37 Id. at 478. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (tracing the reasonable
doubt requirement back to our early days as a nation).
31 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (explaining the history of the reasonable doubt require-
ment).
39 See id at 481 (limiting the court's discretion to the punishments fixed by law).
4 Id. at 482-83 (emphasis omitted).
41 See id. at 485. See also discussion infra Part ll.A.
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tencing factors" to determine which sentence to impose within the
statutory range.42 At the same time, the Court stressed "the position
that (1) constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away
facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense and (2) that a state
scheme that keeps from the jury facts that expos[e] [defendants] to
greater or additional punishment may raise serious constitutional con-
cern.94 3 Stevens also distinguished a case where the Court allowed a
judge to consider prior convictions while imposing a sentence ex-
ceeding the statutory maximum.44 A jury passed upon the defen-
dant's guilt as to those prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt,
thereby mitigating any due process concerns. 45 Thus, the constitu-
tional rule articulated by Stevens is: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."46
The New Jersey scheme basically allowed a jury to convict a de-
fendant of a second-degree offense and impose punishment for a first-
degree offense.47 Apprendi's "purpose" was more than a sentencing
factor, and in fact comprised the essential mens rea of the crime. 48
The unconstitutional effect of New Jersey's scheme was to provide
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdict: "When
a judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence au-
thorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately
characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive of-
fense."' 49 New Jersey's scheme "is an unacceptable departure from
the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice
system. '50
D. The Concurring Opinions (Justices Scalia and Thomas)
Justices Scalia and Thomas favored a broader rule that would ex-
tend Apprendi to require prosecutors to try all factors relevant to sen-
tencing to a jury. Scalia thought the criminal should never get a
42 See discussion infra Part .B concerning McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79
(1986).
43 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-88) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
" See discussion infra Part ll.B concerning Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998).
45 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488. Stevens noted that "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres
was incorrectly decided." Id. at 489.
46 Id. at 490.47 Id. at 49 1.
48 See id. at 493 ("The defendant's intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one
might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element."').
49 Id. at 495 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
'o Id. at 497.
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greater punishment than he "bargained for when he did the crime,"
and if he got a lesser sentence "he may thank the mercy of a tender-
hearted judge."51 The Constitution guarantees trial by jury, "[a]nd the
guarantee that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... trial, by an impartial jury,' has no intelligible content
unless it means that all facts which must exist in order to subject the
defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by thejury. ''S2
Justice Thomas proposed extending the majority's holding to re-
quire the trying of recidivism (i.e., evidence of prior crimes) to the
jury. Thomas thought the entire issue came down to the definition of
"elements" of a crime: "[A] fact that is by law the basis for imposing
or increasing punishment is an element., 53 Basically, an indictment
must allege all the elements of the offense5 4 For example, if punish-
ment in a larceny case is predicated upon the value of the items sto-
len, a jury must pass judgment upon the value.55
The same traditionally has been true of recidivism: "[T]he fact of
a prior conviction was an element, together with the facts constituting
the core crime of which the defendant was charged, of a new, aggra-
vated crime.",56 Since prior convictions provide a basis for imposing
or increasing punishment, they are elements of the offense that must
be proven to a juryY Thus, Thomas questioned the results in all
cases allowing judges to consider any sentencing factor by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and saw Apprendi as a return to "the status
quo that reflect[s] the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 58
E. The Dissenting Opinions (Justices O'Connor and Breyer)
Justices O'Connor and Breyer wrote strong dissents. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined both opinions, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer
joined O'Connor. Justice O'Connor saw the majority opinion as "a
51 Id. at498 (Scala, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 499 (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
53 Id. at 502 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas proceeded to cite numerous cases standing
for this proposition. See L at 502-09.
54 Thomas cited extensively to a nineteenth century treatise on criminal procedure. See 1
JOEL BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 51 (2d ed. 1872) ("[The
indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment
to be inflicted... "').
55 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that a court could not
sentence a defendant to a term for grand larceny when the indictment had not set out the value
of the stolen goods).
56 Id. at 507.
57 Seeid. at511.51 Id at 518.
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watershed change in constitutional law.",59 She claimed none of the
history contained in the Court's opinion supported the "increase in the
maximum penalty" rule adopted by the Court.6° O'Connor believed
the Court clearly rejected such a broad rule in a previous decision, 61
and criticized the majority for failing to admit it was overruling
precedent. 62 To support her view, O'Connor pointed out the apparent
conflict with allowing judges to consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment
following a first-degree murder conviction.63
O'Connor also criticized the majority's failure to clarify the con-
tours of its ruling. She noted that New Jersey could rewrite the
weapons possession statute to provide a range of five to twenty years'
imprisonment, and then provide in the same statute that a racially mo-
tivated crime would require a sentence of greater than ten years. 64
Thus, she saw the majority's ruling as formalistic. Further, O'Connor
viewed New Jersey's statutory scheme as preferable to a scheme that
places all of the sentencing discretion with the trial judge. At least
New Jersey-like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-provided
judges with factors to consider to promote uniform sentencing.65
O'Connor worried that the Court's decision threatened to invalidate
significant sentencing reform accomplished over the past three dec-
ades, and called into question the sentences imposed in thousands, if
not millions, of state and federal cases. 66
Justice Breyer echoed Justice O'Connor's concerns. Breyer took
a practical view of the problem and stated that, while the majority
promoted a procedural ideal, "the impractical nature of the require-
ment ... supports the proposition that the Constitution was not in-
tended to embody it." 67 Breyer reiterated O'Connor's concerns about
inconsistent sentencing before the Guidelines were established, and
suggested there are too many potentially relevant sentencing factors
to submit to a jury.68 Breyer also noted the contradiction inherent in
59 Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 526.
61 Id. at 530. O'Connor cited Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), to support her
view. Patterson is discussed infra Part II.A.
62 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 532-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor thought the Court
overruled McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), which is discussed infra Part II.B.
63 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 537 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If a State can remove from the
jury a factual determination that makes the difference between life and death... it is inconceiv-
able why a State cannot do the same with respect to a factual determination that results in only a
10-year increase in the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.").
64 Id. at 540-41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 544-50.
66 Id. at 550-52.67 Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 555-58.
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not allowing a judge to consider facts justifying a higher sentence and
allowing legislatures simply to increase the statutory maximum penal-
ties. 69 Finally, Breyer echoed O'Connor's concern about the effect of
the ruling on the criminal justice system itself. Legislatures wrote
statutes believing they could allow judges to increase statutory maxi-
mum penalties based on sentencing factors, and Apprendi calls into
doubt all of the sentences imposed in convictions obtained under
those statutes.7 °
II. BACKGROUND: THE PRE-APPRENDI EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING
When one examines the cases preceding Apprendi-particularly
the cases cited in the various opinions-the surprise and dismay ex-
pressed by Justices O'Connor and Breyer become somewhat difficult
to understand. While some legislatures may have misread precedent,
the Court can hardly be blamed for such misreading. As discussed
below, the general common law rule has always been that any ele-
ment of the statutory offense had to be proven by the prosecution and
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule remained in
effect after 1986, except legislatures could remove elements from
statutes and make them "sentencing factors" considered by a judge by
a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court, however,
never allowed judges to increase sentences beyond the statutory
maximum. Apprendi merely restated this basic rule and stressed the
need to present factors increasing the maximum penalty to a jury.
A. The Pre-McMillan Approach to Elements of Offenses
Before 1986, courts understood that any factor affecting punish-
ment was an element of the offense upon which a jury had to pass
judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.71 The Supreme Court reiterated
this basic understanding in In re Winship,72 decided in 1970: "IT]he
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
69 Id. at 563-64 ("I do not understand why, when a legislature authorizes a judge to im-
pose a higher penalty for bank robbery (based, say, on the court's finding that a victim was
injured or the defendant's motive was bad), a new crime is born; but where a legislature requires
a judge to impose a higher penalty than he otherwise would (within a pre-existing statutory
range) based on similar criteria, it is not.") (emphasis omitted).
70 Id. at 565 ("[TIhe rationale that underlies the Court's rule suggests a principle - jury
determination of all sentencing-related facts - that, unless restricted, threatens the workability of
every criminal justice system (if applied to judges) or threatens efforts to make those systems
more uniform, hence more fair (if applied to commissions).").
71 Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding
"Elements" of Crimes in the Wake ofMcMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATLE U. L. REv. 1057,
1078 (1999) ("If the fact in dispute was part of the statutory scheme and directly related to the
defendant's level of punishment, then it had to be (I) alleged in the indictment, (2) proved to the
jury, and (3) proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain the sentence imposed.").
72 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime with which he is charged., 73  The Winship Court,
however, did not clarify exactly what "facts" the case referred to.
The Court attempted to clarify the contours of Winship over the next
decade, specifically with its decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur74 and
Patterson v. New York.75
Mullaney interpreted Maine statutes distinguishing between mur-
76der and manslaughter. To avoid a murder conviction, Maine courts
required the defendant to prove the killing was committed without
malice aforethought or in the heat of passion.77 The Supreme Court
held this was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause because
malice aforethought was an element of the crime of murder and the
prosecution had to prove every element of the offense, including the
absence of passion, beyond a reasonable doubt.78 The Court also ex-
pressed reluctance to allow state legislatures to define away elements
of the offense by eliminating them from the statute. Allowing such
statutes would elevate formalism above the substantive protections
afforded by the Constitution.79
The Court seemed to back away from its broad reading of Win-
ship in Patterson, and in the process "opened the door for creative
legislatures to evade the fundamental protections afforded in Winship
by carefully drafting their statutes., 80 Patterson dealt with a distinc-
tion between second-degree murder and manslaughter under New
York law. The prosecution had to prove two elements to obtain a
second-degree murder conviction in New York: (1) "intent to cause
the death of another person" and (2) "caus[ing] the death of such per-
son or of a third person."8' A person was guilty of manslaughter if he
intentionally killed another person "under circumstances which [did]
73 Id. at 364. The Court also rejected the contention that "there is... only a 'tenuous
difference' between the reasonable doubt and preponderance standards." Id. at 367.
74 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
' 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
76 The Maine murder statute read: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice
aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprison-
ment for life." The manslaughter statute read: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the
heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought...
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20
years." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n.3 (alteration in original).
77 Id. at 686-87.
78 Id. at 704.
79 Id. at 698-99 ("[Ihf Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined
by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect with-
out effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the ele-
ments that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the
extent of punishment.... Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formal-
ism.").
80 Knoll & Singer, supra note 71, at 1081.
81 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198 (1977) (alterations in original).
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not constitute murder because he act[ed] under the influence of ex-
treme emotional disturbance., 82 Thus, a defendant charged with sec-
ond-degree murder had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.
The Supreme Court upheld this scheme because, unlike the Maine
statute in Mullaney, New York did not include malice aforethought as
an element of murder. Basically, if a state satisfies the mandate of
Winship that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is charged,, 83 then
the state may shift the burden of proof for an affirmative defense to
the defendant.84 Important for the purposes of this Note, the Court
observed that "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which
the States may not go?' in defining away elements of crimes.85 The
Court reached one of those limits-defining away elements of crimes
that increase the statutory maximum sentence-in Apprendi.
B. The Approach to Sentencing Between McMillan and Apprendi
In 1986, the Court decided McMillan v. Pennsylvania,86 and in
the process showed how Patterson's logic applied in a sentencing
context. McMillan dealt with Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act,87 which provided a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years' imprisonment for those convicted of certain enumerated
offenses if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
offense.8 8 Most important for our purposes, the statute did "not au-
thorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for that of-
fense., 89 Thus, a Pennsylvania judge could not sentence a defendant
to more than the statutory maximum by determining the visible pos-
session of a firearm: "The statute gives no impression of having been
tailored to permit the visible possession to be a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense." 9
82 Id. at 199.
83 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
8 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 ("We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional impera-
five, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.").
85Id
16 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
'7 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982).
8 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
89 Id. at 82.
90 Id. at 88.
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The Court, in a five-to-four opinion delivered by then-Justice
Rehnquist,91 upheld the constitutionality of the statute because the
Pennsylvania legislature expressly provided that visible possession
was not an element of the offense, but rather was a sentencing factor
that came into play only after conviction.92 The statute did not violate
due process, but rather merely took a factor already considered by
judges and gave it the precise weight desired by the legislature.93 Jus-
tice Stevens-author of the Apprendi majority opinion-dissented,
arguing the increased minimum also required proof to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, even though the sentence remained within the statu-
tory range. 94
After McMillan,95 legislatures began to expand the judge's ability
to consider sentencing factors, prosecutors began to argue that facts
might not be elements, and "courts retreated to the usual approaches
of statutory construction - grammatical parsing, legislative history
and intent, statutory maxims, and the like.",96 One only has to look to
Castillo v. United States,97 decided three weeks before Apprendi, for
an example of such microanalysis.98 For our purposes, however, the
only important consideration is that the Supreme Court never explic-
itly allowed judges to sentence above the statutory maximum by con-
sidering sentencing factors other than prior convictions. Judges could
91 This makes one wonder why Rehnquist dissented in Apprendi, since the Apprendi ma-
jority merely applied the "increase in the statutory maximum" limitation found in Patterson.
2 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86. This was the first time the Court ever used the term
"sentencing factor."
93 Id. at 89-90.
94 Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a State provides that a specific component of a
prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that
component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the meaning of
... In re Winship."). It is interesting to note that Stevens actually retreated in Apprendi by only
calling into question sentencing factors allowing for penalties above the statutory maximum.
The Apprendi test is much more limited and concrete than the "special stigma/punishment"
standard Stevens articulated in McMillan.
9- Several authors have criticized McMillan and its progeny, but such criticism is beyond
the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated
Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992) (disagreeing with McMillan and finding no reason to treat sentencing
factors differently than elements of the offense); Knoll & Singer, supra note 71 (criticizing
McMillan and the attempts by legislatures and courts to stretch its limits, particularly in the drug
context).
96 See Knoll & Singer, supra note 71, at 1085. The authors note that courts have used a
number of methods to resolve the issue of whether a fact is an element of a crime or a mere
sentencing factor. "These methods include: (1) examining the placement within the statute of
the fact in question, (2) whether the fact is easy or difficult to prove, and (3) the potential preju-
dice to the defendant of having the disputed fact presented to the jury." Id. The authors specifi-
cally refer to the amount of drugs in federal drug sentencing, discussed infra Part III.B.1.
97 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
98 Id. at 124-26 (discussing the placement of dashes and subsections to determine legisla-
tive intent and the desirability of allowing a jury, rather than a judge, to determine whether a
defendant carried a machine gun).
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only consider factors within the sentencing range by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The prior conviction distinction emerged with the Court's deci-
sion in Almendarez-Torres v. United States.99 A federal statute for-
bids deported aliens from returning to the United States without spe-
cial permission, and authorizes a maximum prison term of two
years. 1'0 A subsection of the statute authorizes a maximum prison
term of twenty years if the initial deportation followed a felony con-
viction. 101 The Court, with Justice Breyer writing the five-to-four
majority opinion, found the statute constitutional because a prior con-
viction "is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine."2 He
further justified the exception by arguing a "permissive maximum" is
less harmful to a defendant than McMillan's higher "mandatory mini-
mum" because judges are not bound by statutory maximums, whereas
they are bound by the minimum.10 3 As in Castillo, Breyer focused on
legislative intent, parsing every word, phrase, comma, and colon, and
concluded Congress intended prior convictions to operate as sentenc-
ing factors. 104
The final case providing the handwriting on the wall before Ap-
prendi was Jones v. United States.105 Jones was indicted for, among
other things, violating the federal carjacking statute, 10 6 which carried
a maximum fifteen-year sentence. 1 7 At the sentencing hearing fol-
lowing conviction, the judge determined by a preponderance of the
evidence that serious bodily injury resulted from the carjacking,
which increased the statutory maximum to twenty-five years.108 The
Court, in a five-to-four opinion written by Justice Souter, struck down
the provision allowing the increased maximum sentence. 1°9 Justice
Souter concluded Congress "intended serious bodily injury to be an
element defining an aggravated form of the crime."' 10 He noted that
the McMillan Court did not authorize judges to consider factors in-
9 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
'00 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994).
'oi Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at226 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (1994)).
02 Id. at 230. Interestingly, the swing vote from this case to Apprendi was Justice Tho-
mas, who in two years has apparently changed his mind and decided recidivism is an element
that must be charged to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
103 Id. at 244-45 ("IThe risk of unfairness to a particular defendant is no less, and may
well be greater, when a mandatory minimum sentence, rather than a permissive maximum sen-
tence, is at issue.").
'04 Id. at 230-35.
'0' 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
'0" 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988).
'0o Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
los 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) (1988).
109 Jones, 526 U.S. at 231. The breakdown of the justices was the same as inApprendi.0 Id. at236.
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creasing the statutory maximum penalty,1 ' and distinguished Almen-
darez-Torres as dealing with recidivism. l2  The Court relegated the
rule ultimately adopted by Apprendi to a footnote. 113 After Jones, the
result in Apprendi should have surprised no one.
III. FALLOuT: APPROACHES TO SENTENCING IN THE WAKE OF
APPRENDI
While the rule articulated in Apprendi might encourage a large
number of convicts and defendants to argue its applicability to their
cases, 114 the rule will not actually affect many classes of federal
cases." 5 Some of the classes affected are rather large," 6 and others
are smaller,1 7 but for the most part judges sentence within the statu-
tory range. Thus, this section begins with a discussion of areas Ap-
prendi will not affect. The Note will then conclude with two repre-
sentative examples of Apprendi's impact on federal statutory sentenc-
ing schemes.
A. Apprendi's Minimal Impact
Most of the cases decided in Apprendi's aftermath hold Apprendi
inapplicable to the facts at issue. First, courts are refusing to apply
Apprendi retroactively to cases on collateral review, mainly because
Apprendi technically announced a new rule and the Supreme Court
did not expressly declare retroactivity. Second, in the vast majority of
cases, the sentences imposed were within the statutory range, even if
the judges were allowed to consider factors that could have increased
the statutory maximum. These courts held Apprendi does not apply
where the defendant receives a sentence below the statutory maxi-
mum. Finally, until the Supreme Court addresses the concerns ex-
pressed by Justices Stevens and Thomas about Almendarez-Torres,
.. Id. at 242 ("[The McMillan Court] observe[d] that the result might have been different
if proof of visible possession had exposed a defendant to a sentence beyond the maximum that
the statute otherwise set without reference to that fact.").
112 Id. at 249 ("A prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures
satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.").
113 So I will follow suit. "[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior convic-
tion) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submit-
ted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
114 See A Revolution in Sentencing?, WASH. POST, August 29, 2000, at A16 ("The litiga-
tion Apprendi is unleashing will offer ample opportunities for the court to begin clarifying its
principle."). Other than the possibility of including recidivism under the rule, however, there is
very little to clarify.
15 As stated earlier, this Note does not attempt to address possible effects under state
statutes, nor does it attempt to address implications under the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines. Thus, the two examples will focus on federal statutory sentencing schemes.
116 See infra Part III.B. I (dealing with sentencing under a federal drug statute).
117 See infra Part III.B.2 (dealing with sentencing under the Sherman Act).
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judges can consider prior convictions to impose sentences in excess
of the statutory maximum.
1. Retroactivity
A concern emphatically expressed by Justices O'Connor and
Breyer in their dissents in Apprendi was the potential for gridlock as
prisoners sought collateral review of their sentences. The Chief Judge
of the Third Circuit has noted the filing of seventeen habeas petitions
over a six-week period by prisoners citing Apprendi and seeking col-
lateral review.118 While concerns about the volume of appeals filed
may be legitimate, it does not appear that Apprendi will apply retroac-
tively. Thus, judges should be able to summarily dismiss any collat-
eral appeals filed because prisoners think their sentences violate the
Apprendi rule.
The lead case on retroactivity and post-conviction proceedings is
Teague v. Lane.119 Generally, new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review. 12 The relevant exception for our purposes is that a new rule
should be applied retroactively "if it requires the observance of 'those
procedures that.., are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." ' 2'
This exception refers to "watershed rules of criminal procedure,
122
and should apply very narrowly to cases where failure to apply the
new rule will undermine the fairness of convictions or seriously di-
minish the accuracy of convictions.123 In addition, the Supreme Court
has stated that it will announce retroactivity, either in the lead case or
in subsequent cases. 124
11 United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 237 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (Becker, C.J., concurring)
cert. denied, 121 S. CL 2015 (2001).
19 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
120 Id. at 305 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Note, however, that new rules are applicable to
cases on direct review. Thus, if a trial judge or jury convicts a defendant, and the Supreme
Court then adopts a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, the new rule applies on the
defendant's appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 231 F.3d 445, 453 (8th Cir. 2000),
(citing Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 80 (1994)), and Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328
(1987)) ("The government has raised no procedural impediments to our considering the issue,
and, in any event a new constitutional criminal procedure is normally applied retroactively to all
cases pending on direct review"), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1244 (2001); State v. Guice, 541
S.E.2d 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding Apprendi rule applies on direct review and remanding
for resentencing). In contrast, this Note considers whether a new rule, such as the one articu-
lated in Apprendi, applies on collateral review, when a defendant has already exhausted all of
his direct appeals.
121 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
'22 Id. at 311.
'23 Id. at 315.
'24 let at 300-0 1.
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The threshold question, of course, is whether Apprendi announces
a new rule. Teague defines a new rule as one "not dictated by prece-
dent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."
1 5
In Sawyer v. Smith,126 the Court noted that "Teague serves to ensure
that gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists
may disagree are not later used to upset the finality of state convic-
tions valid when entered."127 In other words, if an old rule confuses
lower courts, the Supreme Court's clarification of the old rule quali-
fies as a "new" rule under Teague.1 8 Thus, even if Apprendi did not
articulate a rule any different from existing precedent, it did synthe-
size and clarify a rule that caused confusion among reasonable courts.
While not actually "new" after thoroughly examining precedent, the
Apprendi rule is technically "new" under Teague because of the con-
fusing application of sentencing laws in the lower courts.
29
The question then becomes whether Apprendi qualifies as a "wa-
tershed change" that diminishes the accuracy of convictions obtained
under the old rule. The Supreme Court has never invoked this excep-
tion to the general rule that new rules do not apply to cases on collat-
eral review. 130 Several circuits, however, have retroactively applied
the rule of Cage v. Louisiana,131 which held a jury instruction that
lowered the reasonable doubt standard violated the defendant's due
process rights. The Third Circuit applied Cage retroactively because
the incorrect reasonable doubt instruction "necessarily implicate[d]
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding in a manner that call[ed]
the accuracy of its outcome into doubt."'
' 32
12 Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted).
126 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
127 Id. at 234.
128 Note, however, that if the Court merely restates an old rule where there was no cause
for confusion in the lower courts, the Court's decision would be retroactive. Id. at 246 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (noting that "[iun such circumstances, a defendant is entitled to the retroac-
tive benefit of the decision he seeks to invoke"). Conceiving of such a set of circumstances is
admittedly difficult.
129 The post-Apprendi courts addressing the issue unanimously agree. See, e.g., Jones v.
Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding thatApprendi's new rule does not apply
retroactively); West v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846-47 (D. Md. 2000) aft'd 246 F.3d
671 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting the Supreme Court has never identified any "watershed principle"
that warranted retroactive application). See also cases cited infra notes 137, 139-40.
130 See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding Apprendi does
not apply retroactively and noting that "since Teague, the Court has yet to find a single rule that
qualifies under the [watershed rule] exception"); United States v. Gibbs, 125 F. Supp. 2d 700,
704 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting "[the Court] has yet to invoke the [watershed rule] exception.").
131 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). For a listing of the circuits applying Cage retroac-
tively, see Gibbs, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
132 West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 61 (3d Cir. 2000).
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In Neder v. United States,133 however, the Supreme Court refused
to overturn a conviction where the trial judge failed to submit the ele-
ment of materiality to the jury because "an instruction that omits an
element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair."'134 The failure to submit a sentencing factor to
a jury does not call into question the accuracy of the underlying con-
viction, but rather is analytically similar to the materiality element in
Neder. As such, the Apprendi rule does not constitute a "watershed
change" and should not apply retroactively.
135
Most courts addressing the retroactivity question after Apprendi
have failed to grant petitions for collateral review136 because the Su-
preme Court did not explicitly command retroactive application of the
Apprendi rule137 and Teague does not mandate retroactivity. 138  The
Supreme Court could subsequently declare the retroactivity of Ap-
prendi,139 but such a declaration seems unlikely considering the lan-
guage of Teague. Applying Apprendi retroactively would merely
serve to decrease prisoners' sentences and would not serve to bring
their convictions into question. Juries passed upon the guilt of defen-
133 527 U.S. 1 (1999), remanded 197 F. 3d 1122 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 530 U.S.
1261 (2000).
134 Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
135 See United States v. Johnson, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-26 (D. Neb. 2000) ("Essen-
tially, the shifting of an element of the offense from the judge to the jury, and requiring proof of
such element beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, does
not directly relate to the accuracy of the conviction or sentence, nor does it implicate fundamen-
tal fairness."); Gibbs, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 706 ("The lack of a jury finding as to drug quantity and
the lack of such a finding made beyond a reasonable doubt does not call into question the valid-
ity of a verdict in the way a faulty reasonable doubt instruction does.").
136 Petitions for collateral review are filed pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
137 See, e.g., Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) ("To date,
the Court simply has been silent on the repercussions of Apprendi. No language in Apprendi or
in the Supreme Court's later decisions even hints at the Court's decision to make the rule retro-
active to cases on collateral review."); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.
2000) (quoting In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1197 (4th Cir. 1997)) ("[A] new rule of constitutional
law has been 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court' within the
meaning of § 2255 only when the Supreme Court declares the collateral availability of the rule
in question, either by explicitly so stating or by applying the rule in a collateral proceeding."),
cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 1364 (2001); Hernandez v. United States, 226 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir.
2000) ("[A] new rule that is retroactive for purposes of collateral attack is not 'available' for a §
2255 motion until the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that this is the case.') (quoting Gray-Bey
v. United States, 209 F.3d 986, 988 (7th Cir. 2000)); In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281, 1283 (1lth
Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the First Circuit "that the Supreme Court has not declared Apprendi to
be retroactive to cases on collateral review").
138 See cases cited supra note 129.
139 See Sustache-Rivera, 221 F.3d at 15 n.12 ("The Supreme Court may yet hold that the
JoneslApprendi rule is to be retroactively applied to cases on collateral review."); Talbott v.
Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) ("If the Supreme Court ultimately declares that Ap-
prendi applies retroactively to cases on collateral attack, we will authorize successive collateral
review of cases to which Apprendi applies. Until then prisoners should hold their horses and
stop wasting everyone's time with futile applications.").
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dants beyond a reasonable doubt, and trial judges enhanced their sen-
tences by considering sentencing factors. Teague was concerned with
the accuracy of the conviction, not the accuracy of the sentence.
Thus, because Apprendi announces a new rule that does not constitute
a "watershed change" under Teague, Apprendi should not apply ret-
roactively to cases on collateral review.' 4° The "gridlock" concerns
of Justices O'Connor and Breyer seem misplaced.
2. Sentences Within the Statutory Range
14 1
As discussed in Parts I and II, the Apprendi rule only applies
when the judge sentences defendants to a sentence longer than the
statutory maximum. When the sentence remains within the statutory
range, judges can consider any factors they deem relevant by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. For example, if a larceny statute pro-
vides a statutory maximum sentence of five years, the judge can still
consider the value of the stolen items by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in order to determine a sentence within the range. Most federal
courts are correctly following the Apprendi rule by requiring a jury to
pass upon a factor beyond a reasonable doubt only if the factor in-
creases the statutory maximum penalty. 142
140 But see United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (D. Minn. 2000), in
which the district court held Apprendi applies retroactively because it deals with 'watershed
rules of criminal procedure' which 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding' and 'without which the likelihood of an accurate con-
viction is seriously diminished."' (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242-44 (1990) (quot-
ing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 315)). The court did not explain how the accuracy of the convic-
tion is diminished, and its analysis seems flawed for the reasons set forth in the text. See also
People v. Beachem, 740 N.E.2d 389, 394-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), in which the Illinois court held
Apprendi applied retroactively, but did not question the accuracy of the conviction itself.
Rather, the court focused on the inequity inherent in allowing a defendant to remain in prison
for an amount of time in excess of the statutory maximum based on facts never proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. While the argument seems compelling, it misconstrues Teague,
which seemed concerned only with the accuracy of the conviction, not the sentence.
141 This topic will be further addressed infra Part mI.B.1 in connection with federal drug
sentencing.
142 See United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 181-84 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding a sentencing
enhancement did not exceed the statutory maximum sentence in a food stamp fraud case), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2615 (2001); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-42 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding a sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines did not exceed the statu-
tory maximum sentence in a RICO conspiracy case); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554,562-
66 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding judges could consider sentencing factors in a multi-count indictment
including drug conspiracy, possession of drugs, and money laundering); United States v. Carl-
son, 217 F.3d 986, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding judge was allowed to determine whether
defendant brandished a firearm during a robbery because the finding merely increased the man-
datory minimum, while remaining below the statutory maximum), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1095
(2001); United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1024-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
a two-level sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines did not exceed the ten-
year statutory maximum for defendant's conspiracy conviction); United States v. Galvez, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 1369, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding judge could determine the value of stolen
perfume in a federal theft case). For application to a hate crime statute in a state court, see State
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3. Prior Convictions143
Apprendi explicitly exempted prior convictions from its holding
because another jury already had the opportunity to pass upon the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the same
constitutional concerns do not attach to allowing judges to consider
prior convictions and impose sentences above the statutory maximum,
and Almendarez-Torres remains the governing law when considering
prior convictions. Note, however, that Justice Stevens "went out of
[his] way to cast the future viability of Almendarez-Torres into ques-
tion"144 by stating "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incor-
rectly decided."'145 As of the time of this writing, however, Almen-
darez-Torres remains good law and courts correctly recognize the
exemption of prior convictions from Apprendi's rule.1 46
B. Two Federal Statutes Affected by Apprendi
Apprendi could affect many state and federal statutes, but in the
interest of space this Note will focus on sentencing under two federal
statutes: a federal drug statute discussed extensively in several post-
Apprendi cases,' 47 and section one of the Sherman Act-a section
whose interaction during sentencing with another federal statute has
not been discussed in any post-Apprendi case.148 The selection of the
statutes is admittedly arbitrary, but the discussion should provide a
good illustration of Apprendi's limited, but potentially significant,
impact.
v. Palermo, 765 So. 2d 1155, 1167 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding trial judge can consider sen-
tencing factors under a hate crimes statute by a preponderance of the evidence as long as the
sentence imposed remains within the statutory range).
143 This topic will be further addressed infra Part III.B.1 in connection with federal drug
sentencing.
14 United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 238 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (Becker, CJ., concurring)
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2015 (2001). Chief Judge Becker also noted "five sitting Justices are
now on record as saying that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided." Id.
141 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489.
146 See United States v. Valdovino-Torres, 230 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
decision) (holding a judge could consider a prior conviction for assault with a firearm as a sen-
tencing factor since Almendarez-Torres remains the governing law), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1174
(2001); United States v. Powell, 109 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[P]rior convictions
... are not required to be charged in the indictment... [and] prior convictions which increase a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum are sentencing factors, not elements of the
crime.").
147 See infra Part lI.B.1 (examining sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)).
148 See infra Part II.B.2 (examining 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), and its interaction with 18
U.S.C. § 3571(d)).
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1. Drugs: 21 U.S.C. § 841
Apprendi's most dramatic impact could be on federal drug
sentencing. In 1999 alone, drug offenses comprised forty-one percent
of all federal convictions. 149 The structure of 21 U.S.C. § 841, how-
ever, makes it difficult to determine Apprendi's impact. Subsection
(a) of the statute defines "unlawful acts" in one sentence, 150 and then
subsection (b) defines "Penalties" by referencing drug amounts and
prior convictions. 151 The greater the amount of drugs involved in a
particular case, the higher the maximum sentence. Prior convictions
further raise the maximum penalty. Subsection (b)(1)(C) provides a
maximum sentence of twenty years without reference to a specific
drug amount. 152  A vast majority of post-Apprendi decisions recog-
nize that, in order to obtain a sentence in excess of twenty years, the
drug quantity must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some courts disagree, however, and argue the statutory
maximum under §841 is life imprisonment. This disagreement, and
the strange structure of the statute, makes this a topic worthy of dis-
cussion.
Before Apprendi, every circuit court found § 841 constitutional
and allowed the judge to determine the amount of drugs involved in
the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. 153  The courts rea-
soned that, once the jury passed upon guilt, drug quantity merely op-
erated as a sentencing factor for the judge to consider when determin-
ing the proper sentence. 154 After Apprendi, almost all courts admit
that drug quantity no longer qualifies as a sentencing factor, but most
have found ways to avoid presenting drug quantity to the jury.
149 See Mack, 229 F.3d at 236 n.1. The federal government obtained more than 23,000
convictions in drug cases in 1999. Id.
150 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994) ("[It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or inten-
tionally - (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or pos-
sess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.").
151 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994). The subsection is too lengthy to include. In general, the
higher the amount of drugs determined by the judge, the higher the maximum sentence. For
example, subsection (b)(1)(A) sets life in prison as the maximum penalty for a violation involv-
ing 5 kilograms of cocaine, while subsection (b)(1)(B) sets 40 years as the maximum for a viola-
tion involving 500 grams of cocaine. Sentences further increase if death or serious bodily injury
results (20 years to life under both scenarios), and if the defendant has a prior conviction (up to
life under both scenarios). See infra note 155 for a brief discussion of subsections (b)(1)(C) and
(b)(1)(D). There are many other subsections, but those mentioned above are most relevant to
this Note.
152 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 105 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D. W. Va. 2000)
(collecting cases).
154 See Knoll & Singer, supra note 71, at 1091-92 (criticizing courts for classifying the
drug quantity as a sentencing factor, and arguing juries should consider drug amounts beyond a
reasonable doubt because the drug amount is an element of the offense).
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The most common way to circumvent Apprendi is by claiming
the statutory maximum sentence is twenty years in prison because
§ 841(b)(1)(C) sets that as the maximum sentence without reference
to drug quantity. 55 This maximum increases to thirty years if the de-
fendant has a prior felony conviction.1 56  Thus, a vast majority of
courts have held that a judge can consider drug quantity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence as long as the ultimate sentence remains un-
der twenty years, but must submit the issue to a jury to determine the
issue beyond a reasonable doubt if the prosecution seeks a higher sen-
tence. 157
For example, consider United States v. Aguayo-Delgado.158 The
defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute methampheta-
mine, but the indictment did not allege a drug amount. 159 At sentenc-
"' 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994) ("In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or
II ... except as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D), such person shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years.").
This subsection sets twenty years as the maximum sentence for offenses involving con-
trolled substances in schedule I or II (these include cocaine, crack, heroin, methamphetamines,
etc.) without regard to drug quantity. Thus, subsection (b)(1)(C) operates as a default provi-
sion. I will not further complicate the point by noting maximum sentences for non-schedule I or
II substances, other than to illustrate that the default sentence for marijuana is a five-year maxi-
mum. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). For an illustration of subsection (b)(1)(D), see United States v.
Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[U]nder Apprendi the 'prescribed statutory
maximum' for a single conviction under § 841 for an undetermined amount of marijuana is five
years.").
156 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994) ("If any person commits such a violation after a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of not more than 30 years... "').
17 See United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding ten-year
sentence under the section 841(b)(1)(C) "catchall provision"); United States v. Ramirez, 242
F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that "when a defendant is found guilty of violating [the
drug statute], he must be sentenced under... § 841(b)(1)(C) unless the jury has found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the minimum amounts required by §
841(b)(1)(A) and § 841(b)(1)(B)"); United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 123-24 (4th Cir.
2000) (upholding a sentence of one defendant for less than twenty years and overturning the
sentence of another defendant for more than twenty years), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 309 (2001);
United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the government
only has to allege drug quantity in the indictment and prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
when it seeks enhanced penalties based on amount of drugs, not when it fails to allege a drug
amount and the judge imposes a sentence under twenty years), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1152
(2001); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the judge could
sentence a defendant with a prior conviction to up to thirty years without requiring the prosecu-
tor to allege drug quantity in the indictment and try the issue to a jury), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1163 (2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861-63 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding seven-
year sentence because section 841(b)(1)(C) provides a maximum sentence of twenty years),
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 49 (2001); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that a sentence of less than twenty years does not violate Apprendi even if the
judge considered higher sentences by referencing drug quantity), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1629
(2001); United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that, if the
government fails to allege a drug quantity, a defendant may not be sentenced to more than
twenty years, or more than thirty years with a prior conviction).
8 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000).
159 Id. at 928.
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ing, the district court considered, among other things, the amount of
drugs involved in the offense, and sentenced the defendant to twenty
years in prison.16° Without reference to drug quantity, the defendant
faced thirty years in prison under § 841(b)(1)(C) because of his prior
felony drug conviction.1 61 Thus, the judge's sentence remained under
the statutory maximum, and Apprendi did not require the prosecution
to prove drug quantity to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 162
Obviously, if the jury does determine drug quantity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, no Apprendi problem arises. This is true whether the
jury makes a special finding or references the drug quantity found on
the jury form. 163 Further, courts hold that no Apprendi problem arises
if the defendant admits the amount of drugs involved or fails to con-
test the amount alleged by the prosecution, either in the indictment or
plea agreement.' 64 This general lack of an impact on sentencing
shows Apprendi's limited effect.
Courts applying Apprendi to overturn sentences, however, illus-
trate the potential importance of the Supreme Court's decision. In
United States v. Rebmann,165 the defendant pled guilty to distribution
of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and understood her
maximum term of imprisonment was twenty years.166 At the sentenc-
ing hearing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the death of the defendant's ex-husband was caused by the heroin
distribution, and sentenced the defendant to twenty-four years in
prison.' 67 The Sixth Circuit held that Apprendi required reversal to
determine whether the ex-husband's death "was caused by the distri-
'60 Id. at 929.
161 Id. at 930.
162 Id. at 933-34 ("If the non-jury factual determination only narrows the sentencing
judge's discretion within the range already authorized by the offense of conviction, such as with
the mandatory minimums applied to Aguayo-Delgado, then the governing constitutional stan-
dard is provided by McMillan.").
163 See United States v. Chavez, 230 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding life sen-
tence because the jury determined at least 1700 grams of methamphetamine were distributed in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir.
2000) (upholding sentence because defendant was sentenced to twenty years in prison and jury
determined more than 500 grams of methamphetamine were involved in the offense), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1208 (2001).
164 See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding defen-
dant's sentence because the prosecution alleged the drug quantity in the indictment and the
defendant accepted a plea agreement, implicitly agreeing to the drug amount stated), cert. de-
nied, 531 U.S. 1114 (2001); Doe v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (D.NJ. 2000) (up-
holding sentence because the defendant was not sentenced beyond the statutory maximum and
did not contest his participation in an offense involving at least five kilograms of cocaine).
165 226 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2000).
166 Id. at 522.
167 Id. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C) (2001), a judge can sentence between twenty
years and life "if death or serious bodily injury results."
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bution of heroin beyond a reasonable doubt."168 The cause of death
was a factor that increased the statutory maximum sentence, and as
such qualified as an element of the offense that required a jury deter-
mination.
Of the courts applying Apprendi, at least one district court seems
to have gotten the issue completely right. In United States v. Hender-
son,169 the defendant was convicted of, among other things, conspir-
ing and attempting to commit drug offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841. The indictment did not allege a drug amount, and the jury did
not determine the amount. 170  After applying sentencing guidelines
and determining the drug quantity, the sentencing range became thirty
years to life in prison. 171 The court held it could not sentence the de-
fendant to more than twenty years on each count because "[t]he due
process clause and the Sixth Amendment require that drug amounts
be treated as an element of a section 841 offense, not a sentencing
factor."' 72 The court believed Apprendi would encourage prosecutors
to allege drug quantities in indictments, 73 and concluded by stating:
"Apprendi prohibits imposing increased statutory penalties pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 841 unless the specific drug amount is charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt." 174
An example of a district court getting the analysis wrong is
United States v. Kelly,175 where the defendant was charged with pos-
session of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court agreed that a
judge could not determine a sentencing factor that increases the pen-
alty beyond the statutory maximum, but held it was acceptable for a
judge to consider a sentencing factor that determines the statutory
maximum. 176 In essence, the court viewed the statute as a whole and
held that once a jury determines the defendant is guilty of possession
with intent to distribute any amount of drugs, the judge can determine
the amount of drugs to impose the sentence. Under this view, the
statutory maximum is life in prison. The court limited Apprendi to
cases where "the underlying offense charged in the indictment is en-
t' Rebmann, 226 F.3d at 525.
169 105 F. Supp. 2d523 (S.D. W. Va. 2000).
170 Id. at 523-24.
"'X Id. at 527.
172 Id. at 535.
173 Id. ("This court believes that, in light of Apprendi, federal prosecutors will allege a
specific drug amount in the indictment and prove that fact to a jury even when the government
is not seeking increased statutory penalties.... Nonetheless, failure to allege the specific drug
amount in the indictment is not fatal and does not require dismissal of the criminal action, but
instead merely limits punishment to the lowest statutory range provided by the statute.").
I Id. at 537.
175 105 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
176 Ia at 1114-15.
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hanced at sentencing by reference to a fact unrelated to that offense as
defined.' ' 177 In the process, the court decided to follow pre-Apprendi
circuit court unanimity and maintained that drug quantity remains a
sentencing factor for the judge to determine by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1
78
The "increases/determines" distinction of Kelly is a distinction
without a difference for purposes of Apprendi. The views of the
Henderson court and the Kelly court cannot be reconciled, and Hen-
derson seems more faithful to the rule of Apprendi. Accepting the
Kelly court's distinction would in effect allow drug quantity to be the
"tail" wagging the "dog" of the substantive drug offense when the
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum because of the judge's de-
termination. Both Apprendi and McMillan explicitly rejected similar
reasoning, and held that allowing the tail to wag the dog would vio-
late a defendant's Fifth (or Fourteenth) and Sixth Amendment rights.
Thus, the correct rule is that if the government desires a sentence in
excess of the default statutory maximum (i.e., twenty years), it must
allege drug quantity in the indictment and prove it to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court will no doubt definitively re-
solve this issue in the near future.
179
2. The Shennan Act: The Interplay Between 15 U.S.C. § 1 and 18
U.S.C. § 3571(d)
Although never addressed by a court, Apprendi could affect the
way the DOJ fines individuals and corporations under section one of
the Sherman Act.180 Section one prohibits agreements in restraint of
trade, and provides maximum statutory fines of $10 million for a cor-
poration and $350,000 for an individual.18 1  While those amounts
177 Id. at 1114.
178 Id. at 1115; see also Jackson v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062, (E.D. Mich.
2001) (following Kelly and holding § 841 "contains one crime, narcotics trafficking, with a
prescribed range of sentences" for the judge to choose from by considering drug quantity as a
sentencing factor).
179 The Supreme Court has, in fact, granted certiorari in several drug-related cases, and
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Apprendi. The courts on remand must
determine whether drug quantity is an element of a § 841 offense, and as such must be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether the Constitution allows the judge to consider drug
quantity as a sentencing factor. See Burton v. United States, 531 U.S. 874 (2000), vacating
United States v. Crawford, 211 F.3d 125 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion); United
States v. Brown, 531 U.S. 922 (2000), vacating 207 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000) (unpublished
table opinion); United States v. Wims, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), vacating 207 F.3d 661 (11 th Cir.
2000) (unpublished table opinion); United States v. Gibson, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), vacating 187
F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion).
180 This Note will not discuss the elements of a Sherman Act violation or anything else
beyond the narrow focus on possible sentences under § 1.
181 Section I of the Sherman Act reads:
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seem rather clear, the standards for imposing fines under the Sherman
Act have caused "horripilating confusion."'82 The statutory maxi-
mums are not the maximums threatened by the DOJ. Pursuant to the
Criminal Fines Act,183 courts can impose fines "not more than the
greatest of - the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
[or] the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section...
.,,484 Subsection (d) provides for a fine of double the pecuniary gain
or loss.185 This allows the government to calculate the pecuniary gain
to the defendant or the pecuniary loss (i.e., overcharge) to customers,
take the greater number, and then double it to establish a fine. Thus, a
loss of $45 million to customers could equal a $90 million fine, which
courts could impose instead of the $10 million statutory maximum
under the Sherman Act.
Before predicting Apprendi's impact, it is important to understand
the process followed to obtain fines in excess of the statutory maxi-
mum. Indictments allege violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1, and never men-
tion the alternative fine possibilities under the Criminal Fines Act.186
Thus, defendants are sentenced "under an additional statute, not refer-
enced in the indictment... as the case was in Apprendi."'87 During
settlement negotiations, the DOJ reveals the alternative fine provi-
sions in an attempt to get defendants to agree to fines in excess of the
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
182 United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir. 1990).
183 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994).
'" 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b), (c) (1994). There are other provisions, but these two are the rele-
vant ones.185 The Criminal Frnes Act reads:
If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense
results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defen-
dant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or
twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection
would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
18.U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1994).
186 See Information in United States v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. (May 20, 1999), avail-
able at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/Casesltf2400/2452.htm; Information in United States v. Showa
Denko Carbon, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1998), available at http:lwww.usdoj.gov/atr/casesl
f3800/3815.htm. There are many other indictments-and other legal documents-available for
viewing on the DOJ's website (http://www.usdoj.gov).
'. Doe v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 2d 398,403 (D.NJ. 2000) (dealing with 21 U.S.C. §
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4 W REVIEW
statutory maximum. This process has resulted in defendants agreeing
to fines as high as $100 million.188
In a 1997 speech, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Gary R.
Spratling called § 3571(d) "the double the gain/double the loss stan-
dard.' 189 All of the cases involving fines in excess of $10 million
mentioned by Mr. Spratling involved plea agreements, but section
3571 would seem to allow courts to impose similarly high sentences.
While no court has ever applied the alternative fine provisions of
§ 3571(d) to a Sherman Act case, the threat of such action probably
contributed to the high fines agreed to in plea agreements.1 9 This
"enforcement by negotiation" is effective because "[pirivate parties
remain anxious to negotiate and settle rather than have their business
transactions put on indefinite hold and incur the expense and uncer-
tainty of litigation.'
9 1
Courts have, however, recognized the availability of the alterna-
tive fine provisions. In United States v. Andreas,192 the court noted
the $350,000 statutory maximum, but agreed with the Government
that the alternative fine provisions of section 3571(d) could apply be-
cause of the gross disparity between the maximum fine and the finan-
cial harm caused by the conspiracy. 193 Interestingly, however, the
district court did not impose the alternative fine.194 Other courts have
also recognized the possibility of alternative fine provisions without
actually imposing them. 195
188 See Gary R. Spratling, Are the Recent Titanic Fines in Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of
the Iceberg? (March 6, 1998), available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atrlpubliclspeechesl1583.htm
(discussing fines and setting forth a chart with fines obtained in excess of$10 million); see also
Plea Agreement in United States v. Showa Denko Carbon, Inc. (Sept. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/3869.htm; Plea Agreement in United States v. F. Hoff-
mann-LaRoche, Ltd. (May 20, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indxl36.htm.
Showa Denko eventually agreed to a fine of $29 million and F. Hoffmann-LaRoche to $14
million. The $100 million fine was obtained against Archer Daniels Midland. See Spratling,
supra, at 17.
189 Gary R. Spratling, The Trend Towards Higher Corporate Fines: It's a Whole New Ball
Game (March 7, 1997), available at http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclspeeches/401 L.htm.
190 For a discussion of the "enforcement by regulation" methods employed by the Antitrust
Division, see Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383 (1998). Waller notes the Antitrust Division "nego-
tiate[s] complex consent decrees with private parties in which the courts play only a largely
symbolic role in reviewing these decrees." Id. at 1394.
191 Id. at 1409, 1427.
192 United States v. Andreas, No. 96CR762, 1999 WL 116218, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1014 (2000).
193 Andreas, 1999 WL 116218, at *1-*2.
194 Id. at *2. The court did not state why it chose the statutory maximum over the alterna-
tive fine provisions.
195 See United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting, without men-
tioning § 3571(d), that individual defendants could have faced fines between $800,000 and $2
million); United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1483 (11 th Cir. 1990) (noting an individual
fine cannot exceed the greater of $250,000, twice the pecuniary gain from the offense, or twice
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While Apprendi's impact in this area will not be very wide-
spread,196 it could significantly change the DOJ's approach to obtain-
ing fines in antitrust cases under section one of the Sherman Act. The
judge theoretically would determine the gross pecuniary gain/loss by
a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing phase, but likely
would merely follow the value contained in the DOJ's sentencing re-
port. Since the gross pecuniary gain/loss increases the statutory
maximum penalty, however, Apprendi requires that the DOJ allege a
value in the indictment and prove it to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The DOJ is not likely to do this because "establishing the pre-
cise gain or loss in antitrust offenses is often difficult." 197
Thus, if Apprendi prevents the DOJ from utilizing "pecuniary
gain or loss" as leverage against antitrust defendants, the likely result
is that the statutory maximums spelled out in 15 U.S.C. § 1 will be-
come exactly that-the maximum possible fines faced by individuals
and corporations. Unless the DOJ undertakes the difficult task of
proving pecuniary gain/loss to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or
Congress amends the statute, individuals should no longer have to
worry about paying more than $350,000, and corporations should no
longer worry about paying more than $10 million.
CONCLUSION
Apprendi should not have come as a surprise to anyone familiar
with the cases leading up to the decision. Apprendi did not actually
state a new rule of constitutional law; rather, it merely synthesized
existing case law into a clear, concise rule. The rule simply requires
prosecutors to submit any factor that increases the statutory maximum
penalty to a jury for determination beyond a reasonable doubt, and
does not apply to prior convictions or sentences below the statutory
maximum. This limited impact means judges will continue to impose
most sentences in the traditional fashion-by considering sentencing
factors and determining a sentence within the statutory range. For
those statutes that are affected by Apprendi, such as federal drug stat-
utes and the Sherman Act, judges will have to take care to submit to
the jury any element that requires an increase in the statutory maxi-
mum. Otherwise, sentencing factors will operate as a tail wagging the
the gross pecuniary loss to the victim); United States v. Atlantic Disposal Serv., Inc., 887 F.2d
1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that § 3571(d) authorizes courts to impose alternative
fines).
196 Spratling, supra note 188, at 14 (pointing out that only nine fines have been obtained in
excess of the statutory maximum, and six others have resulted in fines of $10 million).
197 Id. For this reason, the DOJ has suggested increasing the statutory maximum fine
under 15 U.S.C. § I to $100 million.
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dog of the substantive offense. Such an occurrence is no longer-and
in fact never was-allowed in the legal world.
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